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No country which we style civilized can boast of a law dis-
tinctively its own, for all have borrowed, and all have profited by
the experiences of other nations. This is particularly the case
in Continental Europe, where the laws are based on the Roman
law, modified to suit the political, social and economic require-
ments of each state. And, too, we find that the foundation of
Roman law, the Twelve Tables, was a compilation of the custom-
ary law of Rome, hitherto administered by the Patricians. The
Code and Digest of Justinian, to which the modern world owes so
much, was a revision of the whole Civil Law, adjusted to the
needs of the people, and the Code Napoleon was based on the
Roman Law, as modified and observed in France, as well as on
the Code of Louis XIV, compiled a hundred years earlier.
In tracing the development of the right of Eminent Domain, in
continental law we find only indefinite and unsatisfactory allu-
sions to the existence of such a principle, until the early part of
the eighteenth century, when we are told that France, on the 26th
of May, 1705, adopted a rule of compensation to provide indem-
nity where houses, timber lands, and vineyards were taken by the
State; the damages to equal the value of the property, less its
computed value as arable land.
The story of Naboth's vineyard has been seriously cited by
Merlin and other writers, as the earliest known instance of
expropriation, but, as a matter of fact, it does not come within
the right of Eminent Domain, for Naboth, claiming that he could
not give up his father's inheritance, refused to sell his land to
King Ahab, whose agents afterwards killed Naboth, in order that
their master might seize the vineyard he coveted; it was not even
a "forced sale," as the king got possession through murder and
fraud and not by way of a compensation, so that the transaction,
if such it can be called, was all on the part of the king and his
agents and cannot fairly be classed under the law of Eminenht
Domain.
EARLY MANIFESTATION OF THE RIGHT.
The use of such a right as Eminent Domain could not be
expected in the earlier stages of civilization, for its necessity only
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arose with the desire for public works, and where the respect
for private property has become well established. The right does
not appear to have been clear and certain in Greek or early Roman
law, and it is more than probable that the privilege of the State
to take private land would have been considered an infringement
of the rights of citizens, as these were understood in Rome.
With the growth of public works, however, the enlargement of
cities, and the making of straight roads and highways, private
property must have been utilized, and some rule of compensation
must have been recognized in these later times by those nations
which enjoyed a high civilization.
Turning first to Greece we read in the Athenian Constitution of
Aristotle (discovered in i89i ) that in the adjustment of a dispute
between the cities of Athens and Eleusis, among the agreements of
settlement was one providing for the transfer of property in
Eleusis to the Athenians, on terms that imply the use of an exist-
ing rule for the valuation of private property by representatives
of the city :-
"If any of the seceding party (i. e. Athenians) should wish to
take a house in Eleusis, the people would help them to obtain the
consent of the owner; but if they could not come to terms they
should appoint three valuers on either side, and the owner should
receive whatever price they should appoint."
With the Romans we learn that confiscation was an act of
political power, and, in cases where private property was seized
in virtue of this power, and any compensation, direct or indirect,
was made to the owner, the transaction was recognized in the law
as a "forced sale."
Where an aqueduct was constructed on private land, the
exemption of all charges to the owner of that land, was an indirect
indemnity for its use by the State, and where the city walls stood
on private property, the owner thereof was granted the free use
of the towers, but with the obligation of keeping them in proper
repair. Respect for the rights of the individual citizen was
paramount with the Romans. We must infer, then, that the con-
sent of the proprietors in these cases had been first obtained.
As the power of expropriation was reserved to the highest
authorities, there were occasions when even they could not execute
their plans successfully. For instance, when the censors, in the
year 179 B. C., had devised the project of supplying the city
with water by means of an aqueduct, their purpose was defeated
by the refusal of a proprietor to allow it to be carried through
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his lands. At a later period the senate decreed that it should be
lawful to take from adjoining lands of individuals the materials
requisite for the repairs of aqueducts, upon an estimate of the
value, or damages, to be made by good men, and doing at the same
time, the least possible injury to the owners.
In the Annals of Tacitus, Bk. I, p. 75, we are told that, when a
private house was injured by a public road or aqueduct, the
Emperor Tiberius paid the damage on petition by the party to
the senate. This instance, however, although striking, does not
prove that the principle was generally recognized, or established,
and when, in the year 398 A. D., an order from the emperor was
issued to the prefect of the city to clear the ramparts and public
buildings of certain obstructions which cause fire, or obstruct pub-
lic places and entrances to public buildings, no mention is made of
indemnity. (See Code of Justinian, Book VIII, Title XII, Sec.
4). It is possible, however, that the objectibnable structures
were unauthorized, or had been previously condemned.
The "forced sale" of the Roman law also applied to slaves who
were abused to excess by their masters, and the liberty of a slave
was sometimes purchased with the public funds as a reward for
a service to the State, or an act that was deemed sufficiently
praiseworthy for such recognition.
This, however, with the supervision of the sale of meat, grain,
and other provisions, and the regulation of various trades, which
shows only the exercise of police power, does not come within
the limit of the right of Eminent Domain, which is generally
understood in Continental Europe to-day to be a law that
empowers the State to take private property for public use, upon
payment of just and previous compensation.
There is also a case mentioned by Paulus in his Pandects which
is cited by Montesquieu and many modern writers on the subject,
as showing the existence of expropriation in Roman law, although
it is hardly to the point: "Lucius Titius bought lands in Germany
beyond the Rhine, and paid part of the price. His heir was sued
by the vendor for the balance of the purchase price. The ven-
dor was met with a counter demand for the restoration of the
price already paid, upon the ground that these landsg had been in
part alienated by the prince, (saying that these possessions were
partly appropriated by the prince's order,)' and partly assigned
to veterans as bounty. The question was put to Paulus whether
I Dicens has possessiones ex praecepto principali partim distractas.
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this-was at the vendor's risk. Paulus answered that causes 
of
eviction happening after the sale did not concern the vendor, and
hence that in the case proposed, the vendor was entitled to demand
the balance of the, price." Bk. XXI, Title II, §II.
Nothing is said here of an indemnity, and it is probable that,
if there had been any, the suit would not have been brought.
Of the same indirect character is the fragment from Javolenus,
in the Digest, Bk. VIII, Title II, 14, I. "If a public road is lost
through overflow of a river, or becomes impracticable, the nearest
land-owner must furnish another."
This is more nearly related to the servitude of necessity than
to Eminent Domain, and there is no mention of indemnity.
ITS SPECULATIVE FORMATION.
The Germanic .theory of the Middle Ages was the unlimited
sovereignty of the prince (Herrschersouverdnetat). From the
twelfth century this sense had been given to the Roman texts.
"oinnia jura habet Princeps in pectore suo,"2 "quod Principi
piacuit legis habet vigoren,"
3 "error Principis facit jus."
4 Philo-
sophical doctrine was complacent, and found herein the distinction
between the true monarch 
and the republican magistrate.
These notions were combatted by the adherents of the Volks-
souverdinetdit. The prevailing idea was that there was a real
ownership (in the emperor) in everything, and hence an abso-
lutely free disposal of the rights of private individuals. By degrees.
the contrary opinion, already represented Bulgarus, crowded to
the-front, to the effect that private property was subject to noth-
ing but the sovereignty of the State, which sometimes means a
naked "jurisdictio vel protectio," and sometimes a "dorninium."
Out of this right of sovereignty was developed the theory of a
right of expropriation foreign to the original Germanic legal con-
sciousness, whereby the power of the State, where State objects
require it, is competent to extinguish or modify private rights-
(Gierke, Althusius, pp. 266-269.)
The term "eminent domain" is paraphrased from the "doinin-
ium eminens" of Grotius, which Whewell translates as "eminent
dominion," but common usage, in this country at least, has adopted;
2 The prince has all rights in his own breast.
3 What pleases the prince has the force of law.
4 The error of the prince makes law.
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"eminent domain" as giving a more correct and more explicit
interpretation to the term in its sense as a peculiar right of the
State to take the property of private individuals for public use,
on payment of compensation.
In his work on "The Rights of War and Peace," Book I, Chap.
1, Section 6, Grotius says: "Right, strictly taken, is again twofold,
the one, private, established for the advantage of each individual,
the other, superior," as involving the claims, which the State has
upon individuals, and their property, for the public good. Thus
the regal authority is above that of a father and a master, and
the sovereign has a greater right over the property of his subjects,
where the public good is concerned, than the owners themselves
have. And when the exigencies of the State require a supply,
every man is more obliged to contribute towards it, than to satisfy
his creditors."
In Book II, Chap. XIV, Sec. VII, he says:
"This is also to be noted, that a right, even when it has been
acquired by subjects, may be taken away by the King in two
modes; either as a penalty, or by force of 'Eminent Dominion.' But
to do this by the force of Eminent Dominion, there is required,
in the first place, public utility; and next, that, if possible, com-
pensation be made, to him who has lost what was his, at the
common expense. And as this holds with regard to other mat-
ters, so does it with regard to rights which are acquired by prom-
ise or contract."
Again in Book III, Chap. XX, Sec. VII, referring to the obli-
gations of the State and the individual, he says:
"The right of sovereigns to dispose of the effects of individuals,
in order to make peace, is often a disputed point, nor can they
exercise this right over the property of subjects in any other man-
ner than as sovereigns. The property of subjects is so far under
the eminent control of the State, that the State or the sovereign
who represents it, can use that property, or destroy it, or alienate
it, not only in case of extreme necessity, which sometimes allow
individuals the liberty of infringing upon the property of others,
but on all occasions, where the public good is concerned, to which
the original framers of society intended that private interests
should give way. But when that is the case, it is to be observed,
the State is bound to repair the losses of individuals, at the public
expense, in aid of which the sufferers have contributed their due
proportion. Nor will the State, though unable to repair- the
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losses for the present, be finally released from the debt, but when-
ever she possesses the means of repairing the damages, the dor-
mant claim and obligation will be revived."
Pufendorf, in his compendium on natural law, "De Officio
Hominis et Civis," Tit. II, Chap. XV, Sec. 4, says on the subject
of Eminent Domain:
"The third right is Eminent Domain, which consists in this,
that when public necessity demands it, the goods of any subject
which are very urgently needed at the time, may be seized and used
for public purposes, although they thay be more valuable than the
allotted share which he is supposed to give for the welfare of
the republic. On this account, the excess value should, in so far
as possible, be refunded to the citizen in question, either from the
public funds, or from a -ontribution of the other citizens.' '"
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries we see from
the works of various Continental writers that the law of Eminent
Domain was gradually becoming more firmly established, as the
administration of public works increased, and the necessity of
opening up new highways made it imperative for the State to
encroach on certain portions of improved private property.
Domat, in his treatise "Les Lois Civiles dans leur ordre natu-
rel," published between 1680-97, treats Eminent Domain as a
"forced sale." In Book I, Title II, Sec. XIII, he says:
"It often happens that things belonging to private individuals
become necessary for some public use; and if, in these cases, they
refuse to sell them, they are constrained to do so by the autonomy
of justice, for, all things being made for the use of society, before
any one thing can pass to the use of private individuals, these
can only possess them on this condition-that their private inter-
est will cede to the public interest when necessity demands it.
Thus, a private individual is obliged to sell his inheritance, if it
becomes necessary for any public work."
He also cites an ordinance of Philip the Fair in 1303, giving the
right of condemnation for church purposes through a forced sale
"Justo praetio."
5 "Tertium jus est "Dominium Eminens," quod in eo consistit, ut
urgente reip. necessitate, bona subditi cujuspiam, quibus praesens tempus
maxime opus habet, ad usus publicos arripi et adplicari queant, licet ista
long& superent ratam partem, quam is ad sumtus reip. conferre tenebatur.
Ob quam tamen rationem isti civi quod excedit, de publico, aut ex colla-
tione caeterorum civium, quantum ejus fieri potest, refundi debet."
EMINEUNT'.. DO MAI.NIN EUROPE
Montesquieu, in his great work, "L'Esprit des Lois," published
in 1748, treats the subject of the acquiring of private property
for the public use, at some length. In Book 26, Chap. XV, he
says:
"As men have given up their natural independence to live under
political laws, they have given up the natural community of goods
to live under civil laws.
"By the first, they acquired liberty; by the second property.
We should not decide by the laws of liberty, which, as we have
already said, is only the government of the community, what ought
to be decided by the laws concerning property. It is a paralog-
ism to say, that the good of the individual should give way to that
of the public; this can never take place, except when the govern-
ment of the community, or, in other words, the liberty of the
subject is concerned; this does not effect such cases as relate to
private property, because the public good .consists in everyone's
having his property, which was given him by the civil laws,
invariably preserved.
"Cicero maintains, that the Agrarian laws were unjust; because
the community was established with no other view than that
everyone might be able to preserve his property.
"Let us, therefore, lay down a certain maxim, that whenever
the public good happens to be the matter in question, it is not for
the advantage of the public to deprive an individual of his prop-
erty, or even to retrench the least part of it by a law, or a political
regulation. In this case we should follow the rigor of the civil
law, which is the palladium of property.
"Thus when the public has occasion for the estate of an
individual, it ought never to act by the rigor of political law;
it is here that the civil law ought to triufnph, which, with
the eyes of a mother, regards every -individual as the whole
community.
"If the political magistrate would erect a public edifice, or
make a new road, he must indemnify those who are injured
by it; the public is in this respect like an individual who
treats with an individual. It is fully enough that it can
oblige a citizen to sell his inheritance, and that it can strip him
of the great privilege, which he holds from the civil law, of not
being forced to alienate his possessions."
He quotes Beaumanoir's work on Jurisprudence (Chap. XXII)
as showing that, in the twelfth century, the great highways were
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maintained inder conditions similar to those of the eighteenth
century.
In the twelfth century Montesquieu says this was regulated by
the civil law; in the eighteenth by the political law.
Wolff, in his "fts Naturae," Halae Magd. 1748, par. VIII,
Cap. I, Section 11o to 119, says:
"If the public welfare requires that the Ruler of the State
should dispose-of the property of citizens in a certain manner, the
law should give him power so to dispose of it."
He adds that this power, conceded to the Chief of the State, is
called "Dominium Eminens." "Eminent Domain differs from
the common domain in that the former makes disposition of prop-
erty for the sake of public utility, while the latter does so for
private uses, and also in that the former power is wielded by the
Ruler of the State, the later by the private individual who owns
the property. '"7
He further says that sovereignty (imperium) contains eminent
domain as a part, but that the later is separable from sovereignty,
and might be reserved or limited by the people, and he attributes
to sovereignty (si salus publica exigat) the right to dispose of
the persons of the citizens. This power, which he calls "Potestas
Eminens," is also contained in sovereignty.
The two powers, dominium eminens and potestas eminens, he
combines in "jus eminens imperantis"-the eminent right over
the goods and persons of the citizens or subjects. This right pro-
ceeds from necessity. Its measure is salus publica.
According to his argument the members of the State tacitly
consent to dominium eminens and potestas eminens, and he also
asserts that, when private property is taken by eminent domain
there should be to the extent possible, a satisfaction by the public,
that the damage may be borne pro rata.
In Vattel's Law of Nations, printed at Neufchatel, in 1773, we
read in Book I, Chap. XX, p. 112:
"Everything in political society ought to tend to the good of
the community; and, since even the persons o'f the citizens are
subject to this rule, their property cannot be excepted. The
6 Si salus publica exiget, ut Rector civitatis certo modo disponat de
rebus civium; jus ita dispondi eidem competit.
7 Differt dominium a domnio communi, quod illo disponatur de rebus
utilitatis publicae, hoc autem utilitatis privatorum causa et quod illo utatur
qui civitatem regit, hoc autem privatus, cujus res sunt.
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State could not subsist, or constantly administer the public affairs
in the most advantageous manner, if it had not a power to dispose
occasionally of all kinds of property subject to its authority. It
is even to be presumed that, when the nation takes possession of
a country, the property of certain things is given up to the indi-
viduals only with this reserve. The right which belongs to
society, or to the sovereign, of disposing, in case of necessity,
and for the public safety, of all the wealth contained in the State,
is called the Eminent Domain. It is evident that this right is,
in certain cases, necessary to him who governs, and consequently
is a part of the empire, or sovereign power, and ought to be
placed in the number of the prerogatives of majesty. When,
therefore, the people confer the empire on any one, they at the
same time invest him with the Eminent Domain, unless it be
expressly reserved. Every prince, who is truly sovereign, is
invested with this right when the nation has not excepted it, how-
ever limited his authority may be in other respects.
"If the sovereign disposes of the public property in virtue of
his eminent domain, the alienation is valid, as having been made
-with sufficient powers.
"When, in a case of necessity, he disposes in like manner of
the possessions of a community, or an individual, the alienation
will, for the same reason, be valid. But justice requires that this*
community, or this individual, be indemnified at the public charge;
and if the treasury is not able to bear the expense, all citizens
are obliged to contribute to it; for, the burden of the State ought
to be supported equally or in a just proportion. The same rules
are applicable to this case as to the loss of merchandise thrown
overboard to save the vessel."
ITS LEGAL FORMATION.
The legal formulation of Dominium Eminens in the law of Con-
tinental Europe, may be said to date from the year 18o2, when
it first appears in definite terms in the Code Napoleon; but in
spite of the declarations of principle therein contained, Napoleon
continued to use confiscation as a military weapon against inter-
nal enemies, and this right of spoliation was withdrawn only by
the "Charte de 1814." In the Civil Code the "Public Necessity"
of the Declaration of Rights in 1789, became "Public Utility" in
Art. 545 of the Code, which reads: I
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"No one can be constrained to yield up his' property, unless it
be for the cause of 'Public Utility' and in consideration of a just
and previous indemnity."8
This declaration of "Public Utility" was at first construed as
being satisfied by a mere order of the prefecture, but in the cele-
brated "Note de Schoenbrunn," Napoleon decreed that it should
emanate from the Chief of the State, and as a general principle,
the work to be undertaken by the State, is declared to be of public
utility by an act of the legislative power, voted as a law,
Bosquet, in his "Explication du Code Civil,' Avignon, 1805,
comments on Art. 545 as follows:
"To the citizen belongs the ownership (proprijtg) and to the
sovereign sovereignty (empire). This is from Seneca, Book
VII, Chap. 5 and 5 de beneficiis; "Oinnia rex imperio possidet,
singuli dominio." Such is the maxim of every country, and of
every epoch."
Basquet cites Wolff, Ius Naturae, §1o3, to the effect that
(l'empire) sovereignty does not embrace the idea of ownership,
"Imperium non includit dominium feodorum vel rerum qua-
rumque civtum."'10  It consists solely in the power of governing.
It is only the right to prescribe and order what is necessary for
the public good, and consequently to direct things and persons.
It gives to the State only the right to regulate the use of
these goods by civil laws, the power to dispose of them for
objects of public utility, and the faculty of raising taxes on the
same goods. These different rights combined, form what
Grotius, Pufendorf and others call Eminent Domain. Words
whose real sense supposes no right of property, and whose real
sense is relative only to the inseparable prerogative of public
power. Basquet mentions the solemn discussion in all the uni-
versities of Europe on the inaccuracy of the term, and also the
dissertation of Leyser Wirtemburg, 1673, "Pro imperio contra
dominium eminens," and goes on fo say that, for the State to
exist, it must have the means to provide for the expense of gov-
ernment. In this the sovereign does not exercise a right of
8 "Nul ne peut Etre constraint de cdar sa propriet6 si ce n'est pour
cause d'utiliti publique, et moyennant une juste et pr~alable indemnit6."
0 The king possesses all things through his sovereignty, the individual
citizens (possess them) by their rights of ownership.
10 "The sovereign power does not include dominion over vassals or
the property of individual citizens."
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property, but simply a power of administration. It is not as a
paramount and universal owner of land, but as supreme adminis-
trator of the public interest, that the sovereignty makes civil laws
to regulate the use of private property. When the legislator
promulgates regulations of private property, he intervenes, not
as a master, but merely as the arbitrator, and as the regulator
for the maintenance of good order and peace, and, according to
Basquet, serious motives of public utility alone should suffice for
the exercise of eminent domain, without a rigorous and absolute
necessity being required. Domat is also emphatic on the point
that there should be indemnity in all cases, and approvingly cites
Baldus where -he says, "It is an atrocious power that would-take
the property of another without compensation.""-
He also discusses the arrogation of utilities in private proper-
ties, still effective in a large part of Europe, though happily pro-
scribed in France. He mentions the rules of the feudal system
which show that there were some glimmerings of reason, which
revealed the sacred truths that ought to dominate social order.
In the countries most thoroughly feudal, certain free and allodial
lands were recognized, which fact proves that feudal seignory
was never considered as a necessary consequence of sovereignty.
THE APPLICATION OF THE POWER TO-DAY IN
CONTINENTAL EUROPE.
FRANCE.
The judicial authority of France has had the right to fix indem-
nities since the year of i8io, and the "Tribunal Civil" renders
a "jugement d'expropriation!' in cases where the owner does not
consent to a "cession aimable," but works of slight importance,
such as railways and canals less than twenty kilometres in length
may be authorized by a decree of the Conseil d'Etat; while public
works at the cost of departments and communes, may be author-
ized by "simple decree," and the making of local and rural roads,
by the Conseil General, or by the Department Commission.
Article 545 of the Code Napolgon says that the indemnity must
be "pr~alable." However, the expropriation is pronounced by
the tribunal before the indemnity is paid, or even fixed, but the
principle of the Declaration of Rights is saved by not requiring
possession until after the payment of the indemnity. (Law of
I'Diaboliea potestas est, auffere rem alienam, sine praetio.
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May 3rd, 1841, Art. 53.) The owner has the right of retention
to assure his payments; Planiol, "Traiti El9mentaire de Droit
Civil," Paris, 19o4, Vol. I, Chap. IV.
Under the Law of May 3, 1841, there must be,
(a) A declaration of public utility, made by the legislative
power, for the great works undertaken by the nation, and by the
executive power, for works undertaken by provinces and com-
munes.
(b) The locality must be designated, together with the individ-
ual properties which it is proposed to occupy; this is done either
in the same decree that declares the public utility, or in a decree
of the prefecture. The individual properties are designated in
a decree of the prefecture, plans are deposited in the municipal
offices, and publication is made.
(c) Expropriation, when not a voluntary cession, is the effect
of the judgment of the civil tribunal where the property is sit-
uated. At this point the administrative procedure becomes judi-
cial. This sentence of expropriation cannot be pronounced unless
all the administrative formalities have been complied with. There
is a jury, and the judgment is not appealable. It can go to the
Court of Cessation only for excess of power, or invalidity, or
defect of form. Nevertheless, the former owner retains the
right to possession, and all fruits thereof, until he is duly paid.
(d) Fixing the indemnity is entrusted to a special jury, which
was provided for in 1833;' this is composed of twelve jurors,
drawn from the property owners and tax-payers, presided by a
judge delegated by the Tribunal. The cause is heard on proper
evidence, and indemnity, not less than that offered by the expro-
priator, nor more than that asked by the expropriated owner, is
allowed. It must always be a fixed sum. This becomes execu-"
tory on order of the presiding judge, and the next step is,
(e) The payment of the indemnity into the hands of those
entitled. If it is refused, it is paid over to a public depository,
and possession is taken in favor of the expropriator.
(f) The last stage concerns cases of retrocession, where the
project is abandoned, or the land is not used. Litigation of this
character is in the general jurisdiction of the courts. In certain
jurisdictions, expropriation is looked upon as a piece of good for-
tune, and in Corsica the indemnities are so excessive that the
execution of public works is practically impossible.
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GERMANY.
The Prussian Law of June II, 1874, is still in force, and pre-
scribes complete indemnity (Art. i) in the case of expropriation
for public utility. There must be a royal decree which desig-
nates the enterprise and the work on account of which expropria-
tion is made. For the rectification and widening of public
Toads, the expropriation is declared by local authority (Art. 3-4).
The indemnity is payable in money, but there are cases covered
by special laws where it may be in land.
The indemnity equals the whole value of the land taken, includ-
ing accessories and fruits (revenues). Where the expropriation
is partial the indemnity embraces the greater value of the part
taken by reason of its material or economic union with the whole
and the lesser value of the part not taken by reason of the expro-
priation of the other part (Art. 8).
The expropriated owner may renounce, with compensation, the
remaining part not readily usable. It should be possible for the
owner to procure with the indemnity other land yielding the same
revenue or equally usable. But not if account is taken of the
benefits from the new works.
A special indemnity is due persons having special interests,
usuffructuaries, owners of servitudes, lessees, etc., when damages
to these are not included in the oivner's indemnity. The indem-
nity should be paid to the person in favor of whom it is fixed,
and when not paid or deposited, draws five per cent interest from
the date of expropriation until payment or deposit (Art. 36).
There is a provision not found in other laws that where it is
impossible to fix the indemnity in advance, the proprietor may
have security.
The law introducing the German Code of Civil Procedure
(Civilprozeszordnung) leaves untouched the provisions of the
"Landesgesets" on the procedure in litigation relating to expro-
priation (Zwangsenteignrng) and indemnity (Bk. III, Sec. 14).
SPAIN.
In Spain the idea (Enajenacion forzosa) seems to have crystal-
ized comparatively early. Eschrishe. Dict. de legisl. y Jurispr.,
p. 619, defines it as "the cession or sale which a person or cor-
poration is required to make of a private thing for reas6i0 of
public utility." He says: "It is a general principle c6hsecriated
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by our laws, ancient and modern, that no one can be deprived of
his property except on account of the common utility and with a
corresponding indemnity. Ley. 3, tit. i, part 2; ley 31, tit. i8, part
3, and Art. io of the Const. of 1837. The procedure was fixed
by the statute of July 14, 1836.
BELGIUM.
The law of April 17, 1835, provides a mixed system intended
to reconcile the needs of public law with the constitutional princi-
ple .of previous indemnity.
Possession can be taken only after payment of deposit of the
indemnity fixed by the Court of first instance. The law of May
27, 1870, simplifies the administrative procedure and repeated all
remaining provisions of the French law of i81o.
AUSTRIA.
Has no general law on expropriation for public utility. There
are found many scattered provisions, and also in the Railways
Law of Feb. 18, 1878. In the case of railways the declaration
of public utility emanates from the executive power. Indemnity
is fixed by the district tribunal, composed of a single judge. It
reaches lands, water rights, servitudes and other real rights and
every necessary limitation of private property.
Usufructuaries, lessees, etc., are compensated by the expro-
priated owner. Indemnity is a lump sum for permanent occupa-
tion afnd a rental for temporary occupation.
RUSSIA.
The Civil Code, Articles 575, 6o8, contain dispositions relative
to temporary and permanent expropriation.
HUNGARY.
The law of May 31, 1811, is still in force. Its provisions are
quite different from those of laws in other countries, and hence,
it is not a type. The same is true of the backward countries of
Europe.
ITALY.
The Italian legislation is said (Digesto Italiana) to comply with
the following scientific principles.
EMINENT" DOMAIN IN EUROPE
(a) There should be no expropriation without the expression
of the will of the State; i. e., without a law.
(b) There should be no expropriation without ascertaining the
necessity, or at least the utility of proceeding in the public interest.
(c) No expropriation should take place without previous pay-
ment of a just indemnity; i. e., without complete and effective
compensation in money for the property taken.
(d) The fixing of the indemnity should be had upon stable and
safe criteria, and by administrative proceeding, supplemented
when necessary by an ordinary judicial proceeding.
(e) There should be no indemnity when the value of the land
taken cannot be fixed in money.
(f) There should be no undertaking to restore the property
expropriated to the former owner when it no longer answers the
public purpose for which taken.
The indemnity is fixed by the " "Autoritd giudiziaria,' natural
protectress of the rights of citizens and of society. It is com-
petent to weigh with equal scales the interests of the adminis-
tration and private rights." There seems to be no special jury.
The indemnity must be paid or deposited in a public depository.
Certain urgent cases are specially provided for by law.
In Italy, with its great variety of monuments and public works,
the legislation is most complete and scientific. The subject is
controlled by the (fundamental) law of June 25, 1865, No. 2359,
partially modified by the laws of Dec. i8, 1879, and Jan. 15, i885,
and some special laws.
Thus we see that the emergence of the power of Eminent
Domain was held back by the collective institutions of Roman
law, and appeared first with the origin of individual ownership of
property, and the respect for the rights of the citizen, which was
one of the most important features of Roman law. It was again
retarded by the military system of mediaeval times, when the-
attribute of the state as a source of legislation was lost, and law
became a local institution. It became gradually stronger with
the evolution of civil society, and received its speculative formu-
lation by those natural law philosophers who disputed keenly and
learnedly on the qualities of the power, and so, when it received
its legal formulation in the Code Napoleon, ample authority for
it was found in the works of the scientific law writers of the pre-
ceding centuries.
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The principle has made rapid progress in America, where the
growth of cities and railroads, and the general demand for public
works, is unprecedented, but its interpretation and application.
varies in the different states, and a careful study of the continental
law of Eminent Domain, as it is now applied in those countries,
may be found not only most interesting, but also of great instruc-
tive value, to the student of law.
William D. McNulty.
141 Broadway, New York City.
